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LABOR LAW - COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS-· VALIDITY AFTER
CHANGE OF UNION AFFILIATION BY EMPLOYEES - Among the problems raised in magnified form by the AFL-CIO schism is the determination of rights and duties under a collective agreement when there is
a change in affiliation of the members of the union which negotiated
the agreement. Suppose that union A, as sole bargaining representative for the employees in the particular unit, has negotiated
an agreement with the employer, that thereafter a majority
of union A shift their allegiance to union B. Does the agreement continue to canter rights upon employees who have changed their affiliation? Upon the employees who have not changed their affiliation? This
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question would be acute if the agreement provided for a closed shop.1
Questions would also arise as to duties imposed by the agreement.
Are the rights accruing to the union the property of union A, or its
successor, union B, as representative of the majority of the employees
in the bargaining unit? Is a no-strike covenant in the agreement enforceable against union B? Against union A? May the employer consider the agreement as broken or terminated, thus ending his own liabilities thereunder? Or must he consider the agreement as subsisting
with one of the unions? What is the employer's position with reference
to duties of recognition and bargaining under a labor relations act?
The further practical question will arise for labor lawyers as to just
what can be done to resolve these questions by provisions in the agreement itself. The answers to these questions are far from clear, but must
be sought in judicial concepts of the collective bargaining agreement. 2
I.

Approaching the problem as one of contract, real difficulty arises
from an application of common-law two-party contract concepts to the
relationship between an employer and his employees as a group. Attempt is made to determine who are or purport to be the parties
1 In M & M Wood Working Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, (C. C. A.
9th, 1939) IOI F. (2d) 938, where union A had a closed shop contract with the
employer, the members of union A by a very large majority shifted their affiliation to
union B. After a temporary shutdown induced by threat of AFL boycott, the employer
re-opened his plant with only members of union A who had not gone over to union B.
Union B brought an unfair labor practice proceeding. The National Labor Relations
Board in Matter of M & M Wood Working Co., 6 N. L. R. B. 372 (1938), found
the refusal to re-hire those who had changed their affiliation an unfair labor practice,
upon the theory that the closed shop contract either terminated or was adopted by
union B upon the change of allegiance--in either case the refusal to re-hire constituted
discrimination as to hire or tenure because of union activity. Matter of Smith Wood
Products, Inc., 7 N. L. R. B. 950 (1938). The circuit court of appeals reversed the
board on the ground that the discrimination was in accordance with a valid collective
bargaining agreement.
When the employer in this case sought an injunction against the picketing of
union B after he refused to re-hire them, the federal district court denied the injunction because of defective pleading but indicated its position to be the same as the
circuit court of appeals on the point of rightful refusal to re-hire. M & M Wood
Working Co. v. Plywood & Veneer Workers Local Union No. 102, (D. C. Ore. 1938)
23 F. Supp. Ii.
2
In general as to the nature of the collective bargaining agreements, see: Witmer,
"Collective Labor Agreements in the Courts," 48 YALE L. J. 195 (1938}; Rice,
"Collective Labor Agreements in American Law," 44 HARV. L. REv. 572 (1931),
Rice, "The Legal Significance of Labor Contracts under the National Labor Relations
Act," 37 M1cH. L. REv. 693 (1939); Anderson, "Collective Bargaining Agreements,"
15 ORE. L. REV. 229 (1936); Fuchs, "Collective Labor Agreements in American
Law," IO ST. Louis L. REv, I (1924).
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to the agreement. Some courts consider the union to be the party in
interest on the employee side, devolving rights upon the individual
employee.8 Others hold that the individual employee is the party contracting through his agent, the union.' Still others, completely bogging
down and throwing up their hands in despair, say that employees as a
group are incapable of contracting 5 or that at most the "agreement"
can only establish usages or customs.6 Occasionally, in order to reach
a desired result, a court will employ an incongruous mixture of these
theories.7 One writer, at least, has suggested that the collective agreement be removed from the formalistic area of parties, offer and acceptance, and analogized to wage and hour legislation. 8
The questions arising out of shifting union membership are likely
to be resolved in as many different ways as there are theories of the
nature of the collective agreement. When the agreement provides for
a closed shop, as in M & M Wood Working Co. v. National Labor
Relations B oard,9 the court is apt to conclude that the union is a principal party to the agreement and the inquiry will then turn to the
question whether there has been a legal dissolution of the union or
merger into another union. The important thing to note is that such an
approach assumes that the representative negotiating the agreement
is the real party in interest and that without its consent, legally obtained, or its due and proper elimination from the scene, nothing can
8 Yazoo & M. V. R. R. v. Sideboard, 161 Miss. 4, 133 So. 669 (1931); Gulla
v. Barton, 164 App. Div. 293, 149 N. Y. S. 952 (1914); Donovan v. Travers, 285
Mass. 167, 188 N. E. 705 (1934).
4 Mueller v. Chicago & N. W. R. R., 194 Minn. 83, 259 N. W. 798 (1935);
Yazoo & M. V. R. R. v. Mitchell, 173 Miss. 594, 161 So. 860 (1935).
5 Young v. Canadian Northern Ry., [1931] A. C. 83 (Privy Council).
6 Hudson v. Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. R. R., 152 Ky. 7n, 154 S. W. 47
(1913); West v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., rn3 W. Va. 417, 137 S. E. 654 (1927);
Piercy v. Louisville & Nashville R. R., 198 Ky. 477, 248 S. W. 1042 (1923);
Cross Mountain Coal Co. v. Ault, 157 Tenn. 461, 9 S. W. (2d) 692 (1928).
T As in H. Blum & Co. v. Landau, 23 Ohio App. 426, 155 N. E. 154 (1926),
where an employee was seeking to enforce individual rights against the employer
growing out of a collective bargaining agreement, the court gave him rights on a third
party beneficiary theory and held the employer bound on the contract, which had
been made by an employer's association, upon an agency theory.
8 Witmer, "Collective Labor Agreements in the Courts," 48 YALE L. J. l 9 5 at
225 ( 1938): ''Doctrine aside, the essential problems in deciding whether an individual
may sue on a collective agreement are much the same as those involved in deciding
whether he may sue under a minimum wage statute which is itself silent on the subject. The proper inquiries are: Was the statute intended, inter alia, for his benefit?
Can his benefit, and that of others, be best preserved if we adopt this as one method
of enforcing its provisions? Is there any good reason why it should not be enforced in
this way?"
9
(C. C. A. 9th, 1939) IOI F. (2d) 938, abstracted in note I, supra.
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remove from it its rights under the agreement.10 It follows from this,
that although there was only one dissent on the vote for changing
affiliation in the M & M Wood Working Co. case, the fact that there
were ten who did not carry out the change made it imperative that the
overwhelming 'majority be discharged in accordance with the closed
shop agreement, as the exact provision for dissolution in the local's
charter had not been followed. 11 In considering rights under a collective agreement, the courts have been too ready to assimilate those
rights to the ordinary assets of the union.12 But is the union the real
10 Peninsular & Occidental S. S. Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, (C. C. A.
5th, 1938) 98 F. (2d) ·4n; Mason Mfg. Co. v. United Furniture Workers, (Cal.
Super. Ct., Los Angeles, 1938) 2 L. R.R. 838; Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board v.
Red Star Shoe Repairing Co., (Pa. Ct. Com. Pleas, Philadelphia, 1938) 2 L. R. R.
387.
In Cassetana v. Filling Station Operators Union, Local No. 410, (Cal. Super.
Ct., San Francisco County, 1937) I L. R. R. 516, it was held that the rights under
the collective bargaining agreement were the joint property of all the members of the
original union; that the union negotiating the agreement retained the rights under
the closed shop contract for its members, and the union to which a majority of the
employees changed their affiliation inherited the same rights from those members so
shifting their allegiance. The court arrived at the conclusion that the employer had
discharged the members of the second union in violation of the contract. Query?
11 "In accepting its charter [ union A] agreed to conform with the Brotherhood's
rules and regulations, one of which provided: 'A local Union cannot withdraw from
the United Brotherhood or dissolve so long as ten members in good standing object
thereto••••'" M & M Wood Working Co. v. National Labor Relations Board,
(C. C. A. 9th, 1939) 101 F. (2d) 938 at 941. At a meeting held by union A
attended by about 450 of the union's 500 members, a motion to close the affiliation
with the AFL brotherhood was passed with one dissenting vote. The motion to adopt a
CIO international's charter was passed with but seven dissenting votes. Mr. Justice
Healy in his dissenting opinion concluded that the votes of those not present could
not be used to find the "ten members objecting thereto" as they would have to manifest their objection by attendance and voting-and that therefore union A was duly
dissolved.
12 Ordinarily, property rights of the union as an unincorporated associationmaterial property, funds, or any type of right legally enforceable for the benefit of the
association---can only be dealt with by the members of the association in accordance
with the charter, constitution, and by-laws of the association regardless of individual
interests. Low v. Harris, (C. C. A. 7th, 1937) 90 F. (2d) 783; Lumber & Sawmill
Workers Union v. International Woodworkers of America, Local 49, 197 Wash. 491,
85 P. (2d) 1099 (1938). By analogy to the law of corporations those instruments are
construed as a· contract between the members individuallv and the association as an
entity. Weighers, Warehousemen & Cereal Workers Unio~, Local 38 v. Green, 157
Ore. 394, 72 P. (2d) 55 (1937).
But where dissolution of the local in accordance with the procedure set up has
taken place, or where there has been unanimous action of the members and a new
union is organized composed of the same members, it has been held that the rights and
duties of the old union are taken over by the new. Shipwrights', Joiners' & Calkers' Assn.,
Local No. 2 v. Mitchell, 60 Wash. 529, II l P. 780 (1910); Labonite v. Cannery
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party in interest in the collective agreement? May it possibly be said
that the employees, as represented by a majority of them in the collective bargaining unit, are the parties to the agreement? The difficulty here is in developing a concept of an indefinite group as a legal
entity for the purposes of contracting.
2.

What do the labor relations acts contribute toward a solution of
these problems? The National Labor Relations Act in section 8 ( 5) 18
creates a duty in the employer to bargain collectively with the representative of the majority of his employees in the appropriate unit. The
statute contains no qualification on this duty as to time--the inference
being that the duty so to bargain is continuing. If so, it would follow
that when the majority in the bargaining unit changes its representative,
the duty to bargain imposed upon the employer shifts to the new
representative. Such an· analysis tends to support the conclusion that
the real party in interest in the collective bargaining process is a majority of the employees in the appropriate unit considered as an entity,
and that the representative, the union, is nothing more than the agent
of that entity and has an entirely separate identity.1' It may likewise
be argued from the language of the statute that when the majority
changes its representative while a collective agreement is in force, the
new representative should be substituted for the old or the agreement
terminated, for otherwise the continuing duty to bargain collectively
could not effectively be carried out.15
The National Labor Relations Board has gone no further, in the
problem presented by the !1.1. & M Wood TifTorking Co. case, than to
indicate its view that either of two results follows a shift in employee
allegiance. The collective agreement either automatically terminates, or
else is continued with the new representative substituted for the old.10 In
deciding tI?-e closely related question whether a representation question
Workers' & Fann Laborers' Union, Local No. 7, 197 Wash. 543, 86 P. (2d) 189
(1938); World Trading Corp. v. Kolchin, 166 Misc. 195, 2 N. Y. S. (2d) 195
(1938); Matter of American-Hawaiian S. S. Co., IO N. L. R. B. 1355, 3 L. R. R.
687 (1939). .
18
49 Stat.-L. 449 at 453 (1935), 29 U.S. C. (Supp. 1938), § 158(5).
14 The anti-injunction statutes consider the union as an entity entirely separate
from the members of the union. See Norris-LaGuardia Act, §§ 6 and 7(a), 47 Stat.
L. 71 (1932), 29 U. S. C. (1934), §§ 106, 107(a); Segenfeld v. Friedman, II7
Misc. 731, 193 N. Y. S. 128 (1922).
15
It would probably create an embarrassing situation for the employer to continue
to treat with the minority representative in the administration of the existent agreement
while bargaining collectively with the new majority representative in accordance with
the continuing duty.
15
Matter of M & M Wood Working Co., 6 N. L. R. B. 372 {1938); Matter of
Smith Wood Products, Inc., 7 N. L. R. B. 950 (1938).
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under section 9 of the act 17 can be raised while a collective agreement
is still in force, the board has followed the lead of the Railway Mediation Board 18 and assumed that the existing collective agreement did not
stand in the way, and if a new representative was certified, it would
replace the original under the agreement as valid and subsisting.111
This conclusion has been reached even though the existing agreement
provided for a certain representative to be recognized for a specific
length of time. 20
This continuing duty imposed upon the employer to bargain collectively with his employees through their majority representative would
seem to be an application of the principle of representative government as applied to labor relations. Upon a majority change in affiliation the new representative would be substituted for the old in the
employer-employee governmental scheme-just as the elected representative of the people replaces his predecessor in the legislative body.21
Collective bargaining and industrial democracy are not ends in themselves, however, in so far as the policy of the National Labor Relations
Act is concerned, but rather are means to an end,.the end being stability, in the larger sense, in labor relations. 22 Such stability may possibly be advanced by allowing the agreement which is the product of
the bargaining to give definiteness and certainty to the employment
relation for a reasonable period, and this approach might tend to
support the legalistic position taken by the courts in disposing of the
agreement on strict contract principles. In so far as this is true, the
49 Stat. L. 453 (1935), 29 U.S. C. (Supp. 1938), § 159.
National Mediation Board, First Annual Report 23-24 (1935).
19 "The whole process of collective bargaining and unrestricted choice of representatives assumes the freedom of the employees to change their representatives, while at
the same time continuing the existing agreements under which the representatives must
function.,, Matter of New England Transportation Co., 1 N. L. R. B. 130 at 138-139
(1936); Matter of Hubinger Co., 4 N. L. R. B. 428 (1937); Matter of Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc., 8 N. L. R. B. 508 (1938).
It is recognized that this doctrine is qualified by later decisions of the National
Labor Relations Board which are considered subsequently, but such qualifications, being
in the nature of a time limitation, do not affect the basic proposition t!.at the existing
collective agreement of itself does not prevent the representation question from arising.
20
Matter of Brown-Saltman Furniture Co., 7 N. L. R. B. u74 (1938); Matter
of I. Miller & Sons, Inc., 13 N. L. R. B. No. 78 (1939).
21
The pc,litical analogy is, of course, somewhat imperfect in the case of the closed
shop agreement. See De Vyver, "The Intra-Union Control of Collective Bargaining,"
5 LAw & CoNTEM. PROB. 288 (1938), as to the actuality of democratic control over
collective bargaining.
22
"As has frequently been stated, collective bargaining is not an end in itself; it
is a Jlleans to an end, and that end is the making of collective agreements stabilizing
employment relations for a period of time, with results advantageous both to the worker
and the employer." Report of the Committee on Labor, H. Rep. I 147, 74th Cong.,
1st sess. p. 20 (1935).
17
18
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Labor Act may be said to involve somewhat conflicting elements of
policy, and its usefulness in resolving questions arising out of collective
agreements to be somewhat doubtful. 28
No generalizations can be made concerning the attitude of the state
labor relations boards concerning agreements to fix status. The New
York act contains a provision authorizing the board to declare the life
of the certified representative, and it has ruled, that, in the absence of
special circumstances, the selected representative is to remain bargaining
agent for one year.2' As to an election and certification, the Pennsylvania board's policy is to deny requests for an election after recent
certification.25 On facts substantially similar to those in the M & M
Wood Working Co. case, the Pennsylvania board was overruled after
deciding as did the National Labor Relations Board in the Oregon
case.28 It has been held by the New York board that a closed shop contract precluded an election and certification of a representative because
of the possibility of resulting legal confusion if a new representative
was elected.27

3.

The problem obviously calls for a judicious balancing of the various interests, public, group and individual, involved. These are most
.vivid in the case of the closed shop contract, where the problem of
determining the e:ffects of a change in affiliation are acute because of
the collateral results that necessarily flow from that determination.
Under section 8 (3) of the National Labor Relations Act it is permissible for the employer to discriminate as to hire and tenure as
required by a valid closed shop provision. 28 So if there is a determina28

Under the National Labor Relations Act the board is given no duties in refer-

ence to collective bargaining agreements as to enforcement; compare with the National

Railroad Adjustment Board created by the Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. L. 578 {1926),
as amended by 48 Stat. L. u89 (1934), 45 U.S. C. (1934), § 153.
2 ' New York State Labor Relations Act, 30 N. Y. Consol. Laws {McKinney,
Supp. 1939); "Labor La.w," § 702 (7); New York 'limes, Nov. 29, 1937, 1:2.
25
Grant Building, Inc., Case No. R-5 (1937), CC H L.moa LAW SERVICE, 1f
21, 401.003.
28
Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board v. Red Star Shoe Repairing Co., (Pa. Ct.
Com. Pleas, Philadelphia, 1938), 2 L. R.R. 387, where the court said that the employees after entering into a contract for a year should not be allowed to abrogate it
merely by changing their affiliation, "to accept such a principle would be to thwart the
very purpose of the legislation enacted to encourage and legalize contracts for definite
terms and fixed conditions•••• Certainly one year is not an unreasonable period during
which employees may bind themselves to ••• definite• working conditions."
27 In Re Triboro Coach Corp., (N. Y. L. R. B. Case No. SE-201, 1938) 2
L. R. R. 860. Yet where the collective agreement did not provide for a closed shop,
the New York board has held it not to preclude an election and certification. In Re
Enterprise Garnetting Co., {N. Y. L. R. B.,1938) 3 L. R. R. 316.
211
49 Stat. L. 452 (1935), 29 U. S. C. (Supp. 1938), § 158 (3); Matter of
M. & J. Tracy, Inc., 12 N. L. R. B. 916, 4 L. R. R. 431 (1939).
·
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tion that the rights under such an agreement remain with the originally
contracting union A, the employees affiliating with union B will lose
their jobs by the terms of the agreement. Or, if the employer cannot,
as a practical matter, obtain substitutes, he will then, in continuing to
hire the old employees who have shifted, be guilty of a violation of
the contract rights of union A and its members. Especially in this situation the interests of the minority and old representative must be considered if it is determined that the rights under the agreement go with
the majority. How should these interests be weighed? 29 An analogy to
the determination of seniority rights by the union suggests itself. There
is authority supporting the proposition that the seniority rights of
employees may be changed· by action of the representative and the
employer, even where the employee involved does not belong to the
union. so The intangible concept of vested rights cuts across the picture
here; yet it might be reasonable to assume, on a democratic theory, that
since the rights were created by the collective agreement authorized by
the majority, they may be taken away by the same entity.
Where the agreement provides for a closed shop or preferential
hiring, and the union has members outside the particular bargaining
unit under consideration, it would seem that those outside members
would have a contingent interest in the agreement. This interest, while
somewhat remote, has influenced at least one court in· its determination
of the effect of a change in affiliation. 81 The union, as representative
. 29 To say that they are measured by their contract, the constitution, charter, and
by-laws of the union as an unincorporated association, is to assume the result.
Can the interest of the minority be saicl in this case to be any different or
stronger than the interests of the minority where the majority execute a· closed shop
contract with the employer? See Williams- v. Quill, 277 N. Y. 1, 12 N. E. (2d) 547

(1938).
so Donovan v. Travers, 285 Mass. 167, 188 N. E. 705 (1934); Boucher v.
Godfrey, II9 Conn. 622, 178 A. 655 (1935); Franklin v. Pe"rin,sylvania-Reading
Seashore Lines, 122 N. J. Eq. 205, 193 A. 712 (1937); Hartley v. Brotherhood of
Railway & S.S. Clerks, 283 Mich. 201, 277 N. W. 885 (1938). Contra, Piercy v.
Louisville & Nashville R. R., 198 Ky. 477, 248. S. W. 1042 (1923); Grand International Brotherhqod of Locomo~ive Engineers v. Mills, 43 Ariz. 379, 31 P. (2d) 971
(1934).
.
81 In Mason Mfg. Co. v. United Furniture Workers, (Cal. Super. Ct., Los
Angeles, 1938) 2 L. R. R. 838, a majority of the e~ployees of the plaintiff transferred their ~iation from an AFL local to a CIO local. The plaintiff discharged them
in accordance with a closed shop contract with the AFL local, and was allowed an
injunction against the picketing of the CIO local. The theory was that the contract
neither terminated nor shifted to the CIO local-the contract not being the pe_rsonal
property of the employees working for plaintiff, but the common property of all the
members of the AFL local as they had a contingent interest therein for if vacancies
occurred or additional employees were needed, the plaintiff would have to hire from
within the local.
The court also placed some weight upon the policy in favor of certainty and
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of the majority of the employees and an entity of some kind itself, also
has an interest in the agreement. But that interest would seem to be
inferior to the interests of the majority of the employees. The interest
of the parent and affiliated unions is more difficult of measurement; that
they do have an interest which must be taken into consideration is
apparent.
The employer also obviously has interests involved. Perhaps he
would not have entered into the agreement with the new representative
of his employees. Should he be forced to accept the new representative
under the agreement as subsisting? A legitimate inducement to the
employer to make a contract may be the thought that it will tend to
stabilize the employment relation and to lessen the possibility of labor
organizational strife. On the other hand, where the agreement calls
for a closed.shop and the employer is faced with the fait accompli of a
majority shift of his workers in union allegiance, there would seem to
be the counter interest to have the new representative substituted for
the old, for otherwise he would be obligated to discharge the majority
of his employees and face the perhaps impossible task of filling their
places with new men.
The public at large has an interest, both in ending industrial turmoil
in order that production may be promoted and in the well being of
the laboring group. These interests, though somewhat in conflict, and
in any event extremely difficult of evaluation, must presumably be
taken account of by the courts.

4It has been the object of this study to analyze the collective agreement problems growing out of a shifting of union allegiance rather
than to suggest a complete formula for the solution of those problems.
In any particular case the various interests heretofore mentioned will
be present in varying degrees and should be carefully appraised. It
might be· useful for analysis to draw a distinction between a mass and
a gradual change in affiliation.82 A distinction might again be taken in
the mass change situation between the case where the change was
accomplished by a complete dissolution of the old representative as an
unincorporated association in accordance with its charter, and the case
fixation in the relationship, saying, "industrial strife and turmoil are bound to follow
if employees working under a closed-shop agreement can, while such an agreement is in
effect, change their affiliation and disrupt otherwise harmonious employer-employee
relationships."
32 Such a· distinction has been suggested, drawing upon an analogy from the law
of property as to the differing treatment of avulsion and alluvion; and the additional
possible analogy to mass conferring of citizenship as contrasted with individual conferring
of citizenship. See Rice, "The Legal Significance of Labor Contracts under the National
Labor Relations Act," 37 M1cH. L. REV. 693 at 723, note (1939).
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where the change failed to achieve such a dissolution. 18 When the shift
in union membership has been accomplished gradually and has resulted
in only a slight majority in the new union, the interests favoring stability and certainty in the employment relationship could easily take
precedence in support of the position of the old union. But where there
is a mass shift in allegiance, the democratic principle might ca,rry more
weight. Such considerations seem to have influenced the National Labor
Relations Board in several recent decisions refusing to grant an election and certification where the existing contract had only a short time
to run. u The critical case seems to be the one where the shift is by a
great majority, as in the lvl & M Wood Working Co. case, and there
is no dissolution of the old union as a legal entity. Here the various
interests are present in sharpest conflict. The only thing that seems
clear to the writer in the whole picture is that the courts should avoid
a too ready application of strict two-party contract concepts, albeit
admitting that they may be made to apply. It may be necessary to look
at the collective agreement in a new light in order to best protect the
interests involved in such a situation. It may be well for the common
law to show its elasticity and move to meet this challenge with the
development of a new concept, treating the collective bargaining agreement as sui generis at law as well as in fact. 85 Perhaps the problem,
highly involved as it is with considerations of policy, calls for legislative treatment. In any case, it is submitted that the result obtained in
the M & M Wood Working Co. case probably does not represent a
proper balancing of all the interests there involved.
William F. Andersen
38 Where there is a formal dissolution of the union according to its charter, or
where there is unanimous action without formal steps, the cases have caused no trouble,
:.s then the courts can easily consider the new union the same legal entity as the old.
See cases cited supra, note 12.
H The National Labor Relations Board has qualified its concept of the continuing
duty to bargain collectively to the extent that they will not grant a petition for election
and certification where the existing agreement has a term of less than a year to run.
The duration of the contract was not so long "as to be contrary to the policies and purposes of the Act." Matter of Superior Electrical Products Co., 6 N. L. R. B. 19,.
2 L. R. R. 130 (1938); Matter of National Sugar Refining Co., IO N. L. R. B.
1410, 3 L. R.R. 685 (1939).
85 In Brisbin v. E. L. Oliver Lodge No. 335, 134 Neb. 517, 279 N. W. 277
(1938), P haa joined union A, which had a collective agreement with the carrier
providing for discharge of married women. P married but kept it a secret. Union A
dissolved and D union, having no connection with union A, was certified as representative of the employees in the bargaining unit in which P worked, but she did not
become a member. D attempted to get the carrier to discharge her in accordance with
the collective agreement-P sought an injunction to restrain such action by D. Held,
no injunction would issue as D union had succeeded to the rights of union A under the
agreement and had the right therefore to force her discharge.

